This paper critically evaluates the use of revolutionary and evolutionary theories of scientific method, respectively those of two prominent 20 th century philosophers, Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, to account for change in software engineering methodologies. The paper will predominantly assess the extent to which the Agile software community's use of Kuhn's theory of revolutionary scientific change, particularly in Kent Beck's Extreme Programming (XP), is justified. It will be argued that whereas Kuhn's concepts of "scientific revolutions" and "paradigm shift" can partially explain the large-scale, radical change from "traditional" software methodologies to Agile ones, Popper's critical rationalism seems better suited to the small-scale, piecemeal methodological approach of Agile methodologies. The ethical implications to software engineering of Kuhn's and Popper's theories, as well as the work of the Peopleware authors and the architect, Christopher Alexander, will be discussed. Finally, the ideas of the Frankfurt School will be used to broaden the Popper versus Kuhn debate. A critical reflection on the soundness of applying theories of scientific methodology to the practice of software engineering concludes this paper.
INTRODUCTION
This paper, which is the full-paper version of a previous 'extended abstract' [20] , aims specifically to assess the degree to which the ideas of Thomas Kuhn, a prominent 20 th century philosopher of science, can appropriately be applied to contemporary software engineering (SE) methodologies. In particular, Agile software methodologies, a family of related "lightweight" methods fundamentally focused on being adaptable to change, will be discussed. Agile methodologies originated during the mid 1990s, partly as a reaction against "heavyweight" methods and partly in response to the challenges of the Internet era. The popularity of the Agile methodologies, undoubtedly established by Kent Beck's Extreme Programming (XP), will be the specific focus of this paper. There are two major motivations for discussing Kuhn's ideas in this paper. Firstly, they have been very influential in academia.
1 Although Kuhn did not discourage the use of his ideas in other disciplines, he was always puzzled by the fact that they were received far more enthusiastically in the social and biological sciences and in the humanities than in the physical sciences, since the history of the latter, in Kuhn's opinion, differed so strikingly from the former. The second motivation for discussing Kuhn's ideas in this paper stems from their popularity in the recent literature of the SE discipline, particularly in the abovementioned Agile community. Several leaders of that community have referred to Kuhn's ideas, most notably the founder of XP, Kent Beck, who explicitly cites Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the annotated bibliography of his own book, Extreme Programming Explained: Embrace Change. 2 1 Steve Fuller, the founder of a discipline called "social epistemology", writes in [14] that Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions -originally published in 1962 -has sold over a million copies, has been translated into over twenty languages, and has remained for over 30 years one of the ten most cited academic works" and ". . . [it] was the most influential book on the nature of science in the second half of the 20 th century -and arguably, the entire 20 th century" [14] .This paper will assess the extent to which Kuhn's popularity in the SE discipline is justified. As a critical alternative, the philosophy of another prominent 20 th century philosopher of science, Karl Popper, will be proposed. However, since Popper's ideas have been applied to software methodologies in detail in a previous paper by this paper's authors [19] , the emphasis here will be on the ideas of Kuhn. The contrasting revolutionary and evolutionary models of change in scientific methodology, respectively those of Kuhn and Popper, will be used to assess, on the one hand, the change from traditional software methodologies to Agile methodologies and, on the other hand, the "culture of change" in Agile methodologies, especially XP. For this purpose, a distinction will be made between large-scale and small-scale change. It will be argued that Kuhn's concepts of "scientific revolutions" and "paradigm shift" seem more suited to large-scale, radical change whereas Popper's concepts of "evolutionary epistemology" and "falsificationism" seem more suited to smallscale, cumulative change. In section 2 we define evolutionary and revolutionary change and use these definitions in section 3 to assess change in SE methodologies over the past half century. This leads to a brief overview in section 4 of the School of Frankfurt's views, which broaden the framework of the debate between Popper and Kuhn which is examined in sections 5 and 6 respectively. Section 7 gives an overview of some of the most significant attempts to apply Kuhn's concepts to the SE discipline by several founding members of the agile project management and software development movements. The section shows how most of these applications have been uncritical. Finally, the paper reflects critically on the soundness and value of applying theories of scientific methodology to the practice of SE and to the theory of software methodology.
TYPES OF CHANGE
In their most general senses, evolution can be defined as "a gradual development, especially to a more complex form" and revolution as "a far-reaching and drastic change, especially in ideas, methods, etc." [1] . Evolutionary change involves small cumulative steps over a long duration, whereas revolutionary change occurs in sudden and radical "leaps". Neither necessarily implies progress. In their more specific senses, evolution is a biological term, related to Darwinism, which refers to "a gradual change in the characteristics of a population of animals or plants over successive generations [which] accounts for the origin of existing species from ancestors unlike them", and revolution is a political term meaning "the overthrow. . . of a regime or political system by the governed" [1] . When applied to the methodologies of science and SE, both the general and the specific senses of these terms are relevant, even though the specific meanings are applied to both metaphorically. Other important terms are those of emergent evolution, a philosophical "doctrine that, in the course of evolution, some entirely new properties, such as life and consciousness, appear at certain critical points, usually because of an unpredictable rearrangement of the already existing properties" [1] and punctuated equilibrium, namely the "theory that evolution proceeds mainly in fits and starts, rather than at a constant rate (gradualism)" [9] . These latter two terms refine our understanding of the opposition between the terms evolution and revolution.
CHANGE IN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
In light of the foregoing, it is of interest briefly to survey historical shifts from one type of software methodology to another. It will be seen that, overall, change has taken place in a way that is probably best characterised as punctuated equilibrium. Although these changes in software methodology are related to, and are indeed mutually dependent on, changes in associated tools and artifacts 3 , attention below is focused on major historical developments in the methodologies only. In the early years of computing, there was no clear notion of a software methodology. Software was simply developed on the basis of the available technology, whether this meant hand-wiring connections, coding in machine language, later in mnemonic code, and eventually in high-level languages. The principal stimulus for adopting some sort of methodological standpoint about how code should be developed was the need to control the ever-growing complexity associated with software development, notwithstanding the constantly improving tools and notations for doing so. In his famous "Go To Statement Considered Harmful" essay [12] , Dijkstra identified a major source of complexity in early software development. While his ideas were initially viewed as radical, the subsequent rapid and universal adoption of structured programming as a development style had all the hallmarks of revolutionary change. As projects grew in size, it was perhaps natural for managers with engineering backgrounds to look to their traditional style of management in an attempt to control complexity. This meant viewing a project as a sequence of discrete phases, each of which needed to be articulated, documented, executed and signed off before proceeding to the next phase. Thus, once the requirements had been elicited, documented and signed off by the client, an analysis phase was entered. Here the task was to determine a priori various modules of software that could be written by different developers. 4 Further phases followed, including design, implementation, testing, etc. This so-called waterfall model marked a change from informally to formally managed projects. Such a change clearly involved an important conceptual shift, and in this sense, the adoption of the waterfall model could be seen as revolutionary. However, since there were relatively few large projects in the emerging software industry of the time, the uptake in applying the waterfall model was gradual. Nevertheless, it became the orthodoxy of the day, and came to be considered mandatory for proper management of large software projects. By the late 1980s, the inappropriate nature of this rigid ceremony-laden software process had become increasingly apparent, not least because of the large number of failed software projects. Particularly troublesome was the dogmatic requirement of committing to one phase before proceeding to the next. Consequently, there was a strong shift to iterative incremental development (IID), as advocated by Boehm, which later evolved into the more elaborate Rational Unified Process (RUP). This shift away from "big upfront design" relied on object-oriented (OO) analysis and design (once more, supported by appropriate programming languages). In essence, the way in which software was modularised, changed. A module no longer represented a set of similar tasks that changed the state of a large number of heterogeneous objects in a domain. Instead, the focus shifted to identifying homogeneous objects from the same class, whose state is encapsulated and manipulated by functions particular to that class of objects. In this way, the problem and solution spaces were brought closer together. This shift towards gradual commitment of smaller parts of the project, coupled with a new way of partitioning the software into objects could arguably be classified as revolutionary, although the uptake of this approach was also somewhat gradual. However, some found RUP to be unnecessarily heavy on formal requirements. This provided the impetus for various Agile proposals. While these were lightweight in their formal and so-called "ceremony" requirements, they retained an iterative incremental development nature. For example, instead of relying on UML to articulate requirements, emphasis was placed on frequent, informal interaction with the client. Instead of requiring comprehensive documentation of the system's code and architecture, emphasis was placed on co-ownership of code, and the production of so-called "selfdocumenting" code. Agile methodologies are therefore, in one sense, an evolutionary offshoot of iterative incremental processes. However, in another sense, they represent a radical (revolutionary) departure from all previous processes, in that they spurn an ideological commitment to process, placing the emphasis on efficient production of the final product while taking cognisance of the human needs of the Agile team. In fact, Cockburn is one of a growing number of Agile advocates who would eschew a priori commitment to any single process, albeit an Agile one. Instead, he recommends that the process be specifically tailored to the demands of each individual project. The Agile software development methodologies, and XP in particular, have certainly caught the attention of the SE community. Sections 5 and 6 will evaluate their evolutionary vs revolutionary characteristics in greater detail from Popperian and Kuhnian perspectives respectively. However, at this point, it seems apposite to consider briefly the School of Frankfurt, since it provided the philosophical backdrop against which both Kuhn and Popper developed and propagated their thinking.
THE SCHOOL OF FRANKFURT
From approximately the 1940s to 1980s, the School of Frankfurt was a dominant participant in debates on the nature of social systems. Its views were particularly well represented in public media and radical student circles of the anti-Vietnam War era. Being neo-Marxist in character, it had a dialectical notion of how social systems change. This view included social subsystems, such as those relating to science and technology. What follows is a brief interpretative-descriptive summary of those ideas of the School which have relevance to the overall theme of this paper, namely change in software methodologies. We read the Frankfurtians against their own intentions and regard a software system itself as a 'global' system on which the Frankfurtian analysis is (at least partly) applicable.
5 Most of the following items of this summary can be traced to Marcuse [18] . In the view of the School, a social system under scrutiny is likely to be globally irrational. The roots of this global irrationality lie in what might seem to be locally rational. Such points of local pseudo-rationality should be uncovered by critical analysis, and the entire global system has to change if it is to improve. A revolution is, in fact, needed. A corollary of global irrationalism is that, partial or smallscale rationalism within the parts of the system does not inhibit its global irrationality. Thus, attempts at small-scale criticism or small-scale modifications from within the system are seen as ineffective and reactionary, since they are easily absorbed by the system due to its self-stabilising, conservative tendencies. The source of irrationalism in a system is to be traced to driving forces, embedded in processes which are driven by particular interests which produce a supportive ideology. Even the acquisition of allegedly 'pure' (scientific) knowledge and the development of technology is driven by such interests. The development of technics and techniques is driven by interests as well: Together with the ideology produced by those interests, technics and techniques form the system of technology, (thus: technology = technics + techniques + ideology). 6 This system of technology is thus not ethically "neutral": it is based on social conflicts, and further conflicts will arise from it. In addition, change is seen in dialectical terms, in the Hegelian (and Marxist) sense of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Thus, the 'contradictions' between thesis and antithesis are not merely mental concepts of the observer (as a matter of epistemology), but objective realities caused by objective antagonistic forces and tendencies (as a matter of ontology). Moreover, the synthesis is not only a 'mixture' or compromise between thesis and anti-thesis, but has something of a new, emergent quality, which cannot be reduced to (or deduced from) thesis and anti-thesis. The School of Frankfurt adherents would therefore understand some of the changes in software methodologies in the following terms. The waterfall model would be seen as globally irrational, despite the locally rational nature of completing one phase before embarking on another, of maintaining a paper trail of what has been done, of forbidding constant shifts of the goal posts, etc. It was suited to middlemanagers, who needed to maintain their positions of authority and control, and to offer their seniors evidence (in the form of signed-off documents) of progress. Notwithstanding the high failure rate of projects managed in this fashion, conservative forces ideologically clung to the model until its internal contradictions became intolerable. Only then were people willing to change to the incremental iterative approach, which became the new orthodoxy.
The purpose of this brief excursion into the world of the School of Frankfurt was to illuminate the context in which (and against which) thinkers such as Popper and Kuhn developed their ideas of change and progress in science and society. As far as Kuhn is concerned it is fair to say that the School of Frankfurt had emphasized earlier -and strongerthan Kuhn that the historic occurrence of 'paradigm shifts' is not only driven by flaws and deficiencies in those paradigms themselves, but also -possibly foremost-by strong social forces who wish to see their own agendas being implemented as much as possible. In the world of SE, such conflicting interests might be identified as the various stakeholders of a software development project, such as: customers, project managers, programmers, and so on. To followers of the School of Frankfurt, any philosophy that condoned a piecemeal, evolutionary approach to change, seemed superficial and reactionary. It is therefore not surprising that they repudiated the ideas of Popper, who, during more or less the same era, offered a contrary perspective of change. The next section briefly recounts Popper's views. It does not discuss how his views can be applied to understanding the historical trajectory of changes in software methodologies per se; rather, it shows how his views illuminate the internal processes whereby a software system is evolved (changes) within XP-the dominant representative of Agile methodologies.
POPPER AND XP
In an earlier paper [19] , Popper's philosophy, called "critical rationalism", was applied in detail to Agile methodologies. What follows is a summary of those features of Popper's philosophy, his falsificationism and evolutionary epistemology, that arguably demonstrate its suitability to account for the "culture of change" in XP, that is, to small-scale change within a software methodology. Popper's philosophy belongs to the tradition of fallibilism, which includes philosophers such as Socrates, Kant and Peirce, since it rejects the quest for secure foundations (justification) for knowledge. Although mistakenly perceived to be a positivist by the School of Frankfurt, Popper was one of the strongest critics of positivism's attempts to justify scientific discoveries using the principle of verificationism. He pointed out that, while no number of confirmations is sufficient to prove (or verify) a scientific generalisation (or theory), only one counter-instance is sufficient to disprove (falsify or refute) it. Thus, for Popper, falsificationism is the critical method of scientific discovery and good scientific practice consists in rigorous attempts to falsify, test and criticise creatively formed hypotheses. However, despite rigorous testing, the truth of a hypothesis or theory remains tentative (or conjectural). This critical method is inherent in the rigorous testing that occurs in SE. XP takes this critical method even further, as is evident from several of its values, principles and practices, including "courage", "failure", "test-first programming", "shared code (and peer review)", "pair programming", and "on-site customer involvement". According to Popper, all knowledge, of which scientific knowledge is the exemplar, begins with problem-solving. He uses the following four-stage model to describe his evolutionary epistemology (the theory of how knowledge advances):
(1)
P1 is the initial problem, TS the proposed trial solution, EE the process of error elimination applied to TS, and P2 the resulting solution with new problems [16] . These four stages can be seen as a single development iteration in the iterative incremental methodological approach of XP: P1 corresponds to an initial subset of the customer's requirements which are to be realised during the iteration -these are the problems that the developer has to solve; TS is equivalent to the solution proposed by the developer (the developer's "theory") and EE with the attempt, by the testers, to eliminate errors by writing critical test cases; finally, P2 corresponds to a tested subset of the software. This often gives rise to unanticipated problems or unforeseen requirements that must be addressed in a subsequent iteration. XP's iterative incremental development approach provides the flexibility to cope with change throughout the software development lifecycle. Since each iteration is typically short (1 -2 weeks), changes to requirements, design, technology and so forth can be incorporated easily and regularly at the end an iteration. Change, in turn, creates the need for feedback, a value which is encouraged by several XP practices including, "pair programming", "face-to-face communication", "shared code", "reflection", "continuous integration", and "refactoring". Feedback also contributes to simplicity which, in turn, promotes continuous feedback because the simpler the design of the system, the more likely it is to get feedback about it.
The foregoing briefly summarises the case put forward in [19] for interpreting Agile software methodologies in the light of Popper's philosophy. However, section 7 will demonstrate, instead, that various contemporary authors associated with the Agile movement have attempted to apply Kuhn's concepts to this domain, and indeed, done so rather uncritically. Whatever their reasons for doing so, it would seem that a critical perspective on the applicability of Kuhn's philosophy to the software discipline, and specifically to XP, is sorely needed. To this end, the next section summarises Kuhn's notion of a paradigm shift.
KUHN AND PARADIGM SHIFT
Section 2 pointed out that in its more specific sense, revolution is a political term, and that it would be applied to scientific and software methodology metaphorically. In fact, the situation is more complicated. In [9] , revolution is defined as a "term (meaning rotation or turn) which was applied by Copernicus to the movement of celestial bodies in his treatise De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (1543), and which in the 17 th century, after the astronomical revolution, began to be applied metaphorically to political and social upheavals". Thus the scientific sense of "revolution" actually preceded the political. Kuhn's first book was entitled The Copernican Revolution and in it he started developing his ideas that culminated in Structure. In the latter book, Kuhn explicitly compares scientific and political revolutions: "Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of community life" [15] . For Kuhn, the term "paradigm" means two things [15] :
On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given [scientific] community. On the other, it denotes one sort of element, in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science.
The clearest examples of Kuhn's "paradigm shifts" come from cosmology, namely the Ptolemaic, Copernican-Newtonian, and the Einsteinian revolutions. Kuhn divides the development of science into several distinct phases, each leading ineluctably, in an endless cycle, to the next: normal science, crisis, extra-ordinary science, paradigm shift, new normal science. Kuhn argues that a discipline becomes scientific only once all the practitioners adopt a single paradigm. The pre-scientific period is characterised by several competing schools of thought within a single discipline (rather than competing theories, as Popper would have it). Once a paradigm is adopted all practitioners within it become members of a scientific community, whose research is governed by the paradigm. Kuhn calls this mature science and describes the paradigm-governed activities of its scientists as normal science, which occurs uninterrupted for long periods of time. New members are induced, or initiated, into the paradigm not primarily through the explicit acquisition of the theories, rules and criteria of the paradigm but rather through studying textbook exemplars and practising in laboratories, a process of learning that Kuhn calls tacit knowledge, explicitly acknowledging Michael Polanyi. This is an efficient way of training new scientists in the paradigm, but it does not encourage open-minded, reflective, self-critical scientists. Furthermore, Kuhn contends, referring to George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, that the science textbooks are rewritten by members of the triumphant paradigm to suggest that all previous scientific work had evolved rationally to culminate in the present paradigm. This contradicts the historical facts. The reason for this historical revisionism is to indoctrinate the science students and to propagate the myth of progress in science. This emphasises the non-rational factors involved in teaching the paradigm. The fact is, that the old paradigm dies out with the older generation, whereas the new one survives thanks to the indoctrination of the new generation. During normal science, scientists do not attempt to refute hypotheses, theories or the paradigm, but rather engage in puzzle-solving (as opposed to Popper's problem-solving). They resist counter-instances (anomalies) until so many have accumulated that they can no longer be ignored and the scientific community is plunged into a state of crisis.
7 During this period of crisis, scientists practice extra-ordinary science. 8 Kuhn argues that no scientific community will abandon the dominant paradigm unless a new one becomes avail- 7 Kuhn would consider these facts to be a refutation of Popper's falsificationism, at least as an account of the actual history of scientific discovery. 8 It is during this stage only that scientists behave in the way Popper describes, namely, creatively forming numerous competing theories and subjecting them to severe criticism and testing.
break with the old paradigm is final and largely irrational, since the very "rules of the game" (a term Kuhn takes from Wittgenstein) have changed. It is a complete change of worldview and is holistic rather than piecemeal. Furthermore, the new paradigm is incommensurable (cannot be compared) with the old one, so much so that scientists within different paradigms are unable to understand each other. Translation between paradigms is very difficult, if not impossible, since the scientists belong to different "language communities" (a term also from Wittgenstein). Kuhn argues that scientific progress only occurs during normal science within a paradigm, in terms of the cumulative solving of puzzles ("puzzle-solving" is another term from Wittgenstein). Kuhn doubts that science progresses as a whole towards a closer approximation of the truth, although he points out that scientists within the triumphant paradigm would consider the adoption of their paradigm as progress. For Kuhn, persuasion by argument is not decisive, but rather certain non-rational factors are required to convert people to the new paradigm, particularly faith. Nonetheless, this emphasis on emotion towards the end of [15] betrays a shift of emphasis from the beginning where Kuhn argues that the main reason for abandoning the old paradigm is the accumulation of anomalies, namely, the paradigm's failure to solve puzzles, and that the main attraction of the new paradigm is the promise it holds to solve these puzzles. Since the new paradigm should also solve many of the old puzzles in addition to the new ones, a case can be made for rational progress in scientific knowledge as a whole especially since, for Kuhn, the main purpose of a paradigm is to solve puzzles. Indeed, the main activity of a scientist and the measure of his worth is his ability to solve puzzles. It is striking that Kuhn in Section XIII of [15] -in contrast to his book's title-describes his theory in terms of evolution rather than revolution.
Using Kuhnian terminology, XP can be described as one of several software methodologies which belongs to the new paradigm known as "agile", "lean" or "lightweight". Similarly, the "classical" or "traditional" SE methodologies can be considered part of the old paradigm. The following two sections will assess whether Kuhn's theory adequately accounts for the change from classical to Agile methodologies, especially to XP, and whether this change can be described as a "revolution" or "paradigm shift", in the Kuhnian sense.
KUHN: APPLIED OR MISAPPLIED?
One can ask, as an initial critical question, whether software developers can be described as scientific researchers. It seems more obvious that programmers are engineers of sorts, since they produce something that has direct relevance to the ordinary world, whereas physical scientists are concerned with specialised research which often has no obvious bearing on everyday life. In other words, the engineer synthesizes/constructs to produce new artifacts, whereas the scientist analyzes/takes apart to acquire knowledge about an existing (natural) entity. Furthermore, scientists are not normally held accountable to the public unlike software engineers who do not merely solve problems but produce software with clear applications. Nonetheless, both make use of the rigorous standards of modern mathematical logic, and computer technology is essential to scientific research. Can software methodologies be seen as paradigms? Software practice can be made to fit both of Kuhn's definitions of a paradigm, at least in the broadest senses. However, what is not evident from Kuhn's definition is that he was writing specifically about scientific communities, and, even more specifically, communities of physical scientists. In its specifically scientific sense, it is doubtful that the term can be applied to software communities. The proliferation of software methodologies since the early 1990s has been interpreted by the Agile community in terms of Kuhn's "scientific crisis" or "extra-ordinary science". Agile methodologies are seen as the emerging paradigm that will completely replace the traditional methodologies of the old paradigm. The questioning of the fundamental principles, values and practices of software methodology that accompanies the emergence of new methodologies, compares with the similar activity of physical scientists in a state of crisis. This presupposes that software methodologies are already a "mature science" in which a single paradigm does, in fact, dominate as opposed to a "pre-scientific" state, characterised by many competing schools of thought. In fact, this does seem to be the case in SE since, before the present crisis, the waterfall methodology was dominant. However, one should question the assumption that there need be a single dominant paradigm in SE as Kuhn argues there is in science. Cockburn's suggestion of a process per project does not seem unreasonable, although it is a thoroughly nonKuhnian approach, since it implies that rational choices can be made between different software methodologies. Are software methodologies really incommensurable as Kuhn alleges scientific paradigms to be? Based on numerous articles in the software literature which compare methodologies, this seems unfounded. In [8] , for example, Boehm makes a detailed comparison between Agile and plan-driven methodologies and argues for their synthesis into a hybrid. Similarly, in [2] , the authors claim to have successfully adapted the waterfall model by integrating key elements of approaches like "Rapid Application Development" (RAD) and XP. Was the emergence of Agile methodologies in the mid 1990s, a result of cumulative anomalies? If not, what triggered the crisis? For Kuhn, anomalies could take the form of "discoveries, or novelties of fact" on the one hand, or "inventions, or novelties of theories", on the other. Both forms of novelty, however, are not actively sought out -and, in fact, are initially fiercely resisted -by scientific communities. Since, software methodologies do not aim to explain physical phenomena, it is difficult to see how Kuhn's theories are applicable to them in this case. Nonetheless, a case can be made for crucial events causing a crisis in SE, for example, the advent of the Internet era. Object-oriented (OO) methodologies were the dominant "paradigm" at this time and most OO advocates came to recognise that developing at "Internet time" required a reconsideration of the OO process. Moreover, OO projects were often late and over budget. In order to create truly new classes of software which would deal with the challenges of the era -rapid technological change, volatile business requirements, increasing scale and complexity and shortening market time windowsthe OO software process itself needed to be radically overhauled. As a result, the new Agile "paradigm" emerged and many of the OO advocates from the old paradigm became advocates of the new Agile paradigm. Can Agile be called a revolution if it has not already become the dominant paradigm in ten years since its initiation? Kuhn faced a similar criticism: "The period between Copernicus and Newton is often termed 'The Scientific Revolution', but the time-span involved, over 150 years, makes the process sound more like evolution than revolution" [9] . However, the initial definition of "revolution" in this paper does not refer to time-span. Whereas political revolutions seem to occur swiftly, scientific and technological revolutions can take considerable time to occur, as was evident in, for instance, the Industrial Revolution. Nonetheless, given the quick rate of change in the Information Age, perhaps the Agile revolution should have occurred already, if it is to take place at all.
Related Work
Kuhn's concepts of "paradigm shift" and "scientific revolution" have been applied to diverse aspects of the SE discipline, most notably by several members of an international IT advisory firm, the Cutter Consortium. These applications are especially pertinent, since the leaders of both the agile project management and software development movements are members of Cutter. This section summarises the literature in this regard. It then critically evaluates the specific position taken by one of the principal authors, Ed Yourdan. Finally, it offers a general critique of Agile's use of Kuhn's concepts. In [5] , Bach applies the work of Popper, Kuhn and several other philosophers of science to SE in the context of the "process vs practice" debate. He argues that, in the 20 th century, even science was a battleground for this debate when the idea of science as a rational enterprise came under fire. The resulting fallible view of science, according to Bach, is pertinent to our situation in IT today. Bach also argues, perhaps controversially, that "Developing software is not much different from developing scientific theory, and developing processes for developing software is exactly like doing science". Furthermore, he argues that the trend to move from process towards practice manifests itself in methodology movements such as XP and object-oriented (OO) design patterns. Schwaber, another Cutter member, does not explicitly cite Kuhn but he frequently uses the term "revolution" in his writings. In [21] he describes the seminal meeting of the Agile advocates in 2001 as a "meeting of revolutionaries". He also points out in a section of [22] entitled "Viva la Revolución", that the Agile Manifesto was a call to arms and is based on principles rather than techniques. In [13] , Marzolf and Guttman use Kuhn's theory to explain the movement known as systems thinking (ST) and how ST relates to SE. They point out that, although ST insists systems be addressed holistically, the most universal char-acteristic of software development is, rather, a short-term, piecemeal approach: "This stark contrast . . . is at the heart of the current controversy between so-called defined and agile development approaches". The authors go on to ask "Should we focus more single-mindedly on building software one application at a time, or should we take a more holistic view?".
10 They conclude that we should learn ST and take a more holistic approach towards building software. This, in their opinion, will ensure the shift from the Machine Age paradigm to the Systems Age paradigm. Mah, in [17] , talks about revolutions and paradigm shifts in relation to celestial spheres. He mentions Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton, and posits that "our modernday Copernicuses and Galileos are folks like the DeMarcos, Listers, Putnams, Yourdons, Orrs, et al" 11 . Mah criticises that we still seem to be operating in the Industrial Age paradigm instead of the Information Age paradigm when we talk about manufacturing as opposed to designing software. In [24] , Windholtz paraphrases several talks from the 2002 XP Agile Universe conference. Most notably, for the purpose of this paper, are the talks by Martin Fowler and David West. Fowler argues that the Agile and XP movements are a large shift in how people think about software development: "The change in attitude is twofold: (1) a change in attitude toward change and (2) a change in attitude toward people". West, on the other hand, attempts to answer, firstly, why there is an undercurrent of revolution in the Agile community and, secondly, how one should properly conduct a revolution. In [10] , Davies explicitly cites Kuhn's Structure and claims that understanding Agile Software Development requires a paradigm shift. He also references Wittgenstein's DuckRabbit. In [25] , Yourdon, one of the members of the Cutter Consortium, references Kuhn's Structure and applies his concept of "paradigm shift" to IT organisations in the context of ad hoc communication networks. In [26] , he applies Kuhnian terminology specifically to XP by describing "classical" SE as the old paradigm and "agile", "lean" or "light" software development as the new paradigm. In the same article, he notes Beck's presentation at the 2001 Cutter Summit conference in which Beck explicitly describes XP as a "paradigm shift". Since Yourdon makes the most explicit and detailed use of Kuhn's concepts in Agile software circles, we discuss his ideas in somewhat greater detail in the following subsection.
Critique of Yourdon
In spite of his various references to Kuhn, Yourdon's account of Kuhn's ideas is sometimes inaccurate and seems to be influenced by the same revolutionary (or, rather, rebellious) spirit identified in Schwaber's article, a spirit which runs contrary to that of Kuhn's Structure, its title notwithstanding. Yourdon's definition of a paradigm omits Kuhn's second sense of the term, namely, "the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science." This omission is strange, given that, implicit in this definition, is the concept of tacit knowledge, an important concept to the Agile community. Yourdon provides a definition of "paradigm" that departs significantly from Kuhn's first definition of the term, when he writes of paradigms that they "perform a reasonably good job of describing and explaining the events and phenomena that we encounter in our day-to-day life". This misses Kuhn's crucial point concerning the "unparalleled insulation of mature scientific communities from the demands of the laity and of everyday life". Most software engineers are not as isolated from everyday experience as most scientists since they are producing artifacts for use in everyday life. Yourdon's reference to "scientists, engineers, soothsayers, or priests" is also very problematic, since Kuhn's "paradigm shift" specifically relates only to physical scientists. At no point in Structure does Kuhn refer to engineers, and certainly not to soothsayers and priests, since he considered himself narrowly to be a historian of the physical sciences. Nonetheless, the reference to soothsayers and priests, if not true to the word of Kuhn's theory, is close to its spirit, since it suggests that changes of paradigm are not completely rational, but require a leap of faith. Similarly one could object to Yourdon's descriptions that "Meanwhile, there's likely to be a band of renegade scientists, engineers, or priests looking for a new paradigm" and "In the past, the rebels promoting a new paradigm were likely to be burnt at the stake". 12 Fuller points out that Kuhn's enthusiastic followers "ignored that Kuhn, far from being a 'scientific revolutionary', argued that revolutions were only a last resort in science -indeed, an indication of just how fixated scientists tend to be on their paradigm [is] that they have no regular procedure for considering fundamental changes in research direction" [14] . Yourdon seems to have shifted from Kuhn's scientific sense of "revolution" to a political sense that is, in fact, alien to Kuhn's theory (despite the fact that Kuhn actually compared the two). Fuller's critique shows how close Kuhn's paradigms are to the blueprints advocated by "big upfront design" methodologies. This is in complete contrast to XP with its many practices for accommodating change. Yourdon's claim that the new paradigm "explains all of the known phenomena much more cleanly and simply [than the old one]" also misrepresents Kuhn, who argues that the new paradigm does not solve all of the old puzzles, but rather abandons many of them, and, in fact, reviews, in the terms of the new paradigm, puzzles previously thought solved. Indeed, the phenomena themselves have changed in the new paradigm, so radical is the break with the old paradigm. On the other hand, the new paradigm does solve many of the new puzzles that the older paradigm failed to solve. A final problem with Yourdon's depiction, from a Kuhnian point of view, is that it presents an objective criterion that allows one to make a rational choice between paradigms, a possibility which Kuhn rejected, and which more accurately fits the philosophy of his rival, Popper.
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING AND ETHICS
Fuller has reopened the "Kuhn vs Popper" debate by arguing that Kuhn's victory had broad and detrimental ramifications since "[w]ith the defeat of Popper (and his followers), the normative structure of science drastically changed", from a rationalist and fallibilist Popperian one to an irrationalist and foundationalist Kuhnian one. Furthermore, Fuller contends that "While no one doubts that Kuhn has won the debate, I intend to question whether it has been for the better." [14] .
In this section, we will study the ethical implications to SE of the work of these philosophers of science and others. SE, as a young field, faces many ethical challenges. Besides questions of intellectual property, software piracy, censorship, privacy, confidentiality and policing of the internet, more general issues have been raised by influential writers. The authors of Peopleware [11] question the tendency of companies to treat programmers as resources, merely as means to the companies' ends, rather than taking their humanity into account. While the Peopleware authors do not question increasing productivity as the overriding imperative, they do argue that programmers will be more productive if their individuality is respected. Christopher Alexander, whose ideas concerning patterns in architecture profoundly influenced a generation of software engineers (most notably Kent Beck 13 ) and whose ideas inspired the design patterns movement in SE, reminds software practitioners themselves of their ethical responsibilities, exhorting them to be aware of the ends to which their software is being used, and thereby seeing themselves as moral agents and not merely as technicians or instruments providing technical expertise (in software) for any ends whatsoever. Alexander's moral imperative, during his landmark keynote speech at OOPSLA '96 [4] was: Ensure that the software you produce will be used to make the world a more humane place. He challenged the audience to build whole systems that contribute powerfully to the quality of life and to recognize and rise to the responsibility that accompanies their position of influence in the world. In order to achieve this, Alexander proposes a meta-plan:"It is a philosophy by which a facility can grow in an evolutionary fashion to achieve the needs of its occupants. The meta-plan has three parts:
• a philosophy of piecemeal growth
• a set of patterns or shared design principles governing growth
• local control of design by those who will occupy the space Under the meta-plan, facilities evolve through a series of small steps into campuses and communities of related buildings". [11] There are striking similarities between Alexander's approach to architectural development and Popper's piecemeal approach to social engineering. Their approaches are both evolutionary and democratic rather than utopian and authoritarian. They do not attempt to fulfil a blueprint at all costs but rather remain flexible and accountable to the needs of individuals. Besides the obvious complicity of scientists, engineers and technologists in the military-industrial complex, the arms trade and the development of new military technology, there are less obvious but equally disturbing examples of their complicity in other industries. For instance, their expertise is essential for the massive and widespread exploitation of animals on industrialized farms, where animals are treated as mere units of production in a ruthlessly and increasingly mechanized process, with dire consequences for the environment. Matthew Scully, a former senior speech writer for President George W. Bush, provides a particularly striking example of the abuse of technology in the hunting industry [23] :
As for the rights of animals, rights in general are best viewed in tangible terms, with a view to actual events and consequences. Take the case of a hunter in Texas named John Lockwood, who has just pioneered the online safari. At his cannedhunting ranch outside San Antonio, he's got a rifle attached to a camera and the camera wired up to the Internet, so that sportsmen going to Liveshot.com will actually be able to fire at baited animals by remote control from their computers. "If the customer were to wound the animal," explains the San Antonio Express-News, "a staff person on site could finish it off." The "trophy mounts" taken in these heroics will then be prepared and shipped to the client's door . . .
Neither Alexander nor the Peopleware authors, however, question the framework of a market-driven economy, whose inherently exploitative nature has had a detrimental impact on the environment and has stoked numerous global conflicts since World War II, and whose power has become virtually unchecked in the form of "globalization" since the ending of the Cold War in 1989. Their analysis, therefore, needs to be broadened. The prestige of science and technology in the twentieth century has blinded most people to the complicity of scientists and technologists in many ethically questionable enterprises, political, military, industrial and scientific, especially during the Cold War in both the East and the West 14 . Scientists have become increasingly unaccountable to the public and, in the West, even to governments. In turn, governments, big businesses and the military have used science for morally dubious purposes, and have also become increasingly unaccountable to the public. The ideas of logical positivism, in the first half of the twentieth century, and Kuhn, in the second, have provided philosophical justifications for this elitist technocracy, in particular their claims to the political and ethical neutrality of science and technology.
14 One example of this is the historical account of the concerns of computer scientists and, indeed, their virtual rebellion with regard to Reagan's call in the 1980's for Starwars research and the subsequent government funding thereof. There were many debates about this matter in the ACM's at that time (circa 1985).
Several individuals and schools of thought have, however, criticised the unethical practice of science and technology. In the early twentieth century, Phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, criticised instrumentalist rationalism. Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt School revealed the complicity of scientists and technologists in the latecapitalist, post-industrial state. In particular, Habermas was critical of the erosion during the twentieth century of "the public sphere", the forum for the critical discussion of public policy. The shaping of public opinion by the mass media, controlled by media monopolies or by governments pursuing their own interests, is symptomatic of this erosion. Although Habermas and the Frankfurt School mistakenly perceived Popper to be a logical positivist, Popper's idea of "the open society" shares many similarities with Habermas's idea of "the public sphere", in particular the belief that democratic citizens should be able to hold their governments accountable. But Popper's idea goes further, implying that the scientific community itself is (or should be) an exemplary open society within the broader open society of a democratic state, since, for Popper, the advance of scientific knowledge depends on critical debate and testing. This is in strong contrast to the uncritical rationalism of the Positivists and Kuhn, who, following Polanyi, argue that the criterion of truth lies not in objective, critical testing, but in the (inter-)subjective consensus of the experts in any particular discipline. Thus, Positivism and Kuhnian ideas lead to a technocratic elitism unaccountable to the public.
CONCLUSION
Considering how questionable Kuhn's concept of a "paradigm shift" is when applied to developments in software methodology, his popularity is surprising. He was not the revolutionary that the rebellious young American students of the late 1960s and 1970s thought he was. In fact, his critics saw him as "the official philosopher of the emerging military-industrial complex" [14] and rather than having killed positivism, "[a]s the Popperians saw it, Kuhn simply replaced the positivist search for timelessly true propositions with historically entrenched practices. Both were inherently uncritical and conformist" [14] . As Fuller points out, part of the popularity of Kuhn is "the innocence [of his admirers] of any alternative accounts of the history of science. . . with which to compare Kuhn's" [14] , such as the fallibilism of Popper or Peirce. Popper's philosophy has been included in this paper as a corrective, although other philosophers, such as Peirce, may have suited the purpose just as well. Indeed, the fallibilism of the latter two philosophers seems far more suited to the principles and practices of the Agile community than the uncritical authoritarianism and elitism of Kuhn's philosophy. In fact, it can be argued that Beck shifts his emphasis in the 1 st and 2 nd editions of [7] from a Kuhnian revolutionary approach to a Popperian evolutionary one, since in the 1 st edition, Beck advocates that, in order to be truly practising XP, all Agile values, principles and practices should be adopted and strictly adhered to, whereas in the 2 nd edition he suggests, instead, a piecemeal approach to adopting XP. Kuhn would say that XP must completely replace previous methodologies whereas Popper would allow a piecemeal approach where Agile practices and principles can be adopted individually and be withdrawn if unsuccessful. The full-scale approach towards adopting XP can be compared to Kuhn's "normal science" in which scientists uncritically accept the basic assumptions of the dominant paradigm. Furthermore, Kuhn's insistence that paradigms are incommensurable suggests that the Agile paradigm cannot be compared to any other software paradigm. However, earlier it was shown that several authors have made such comparisons. On the other hand, the incommensurability of paradigms implies that the choice between them is irrational which, presumably, Beck would disagree with. Instead, he would surely argue that the XP practices are all rational. However, why then does he use Kuhn's irrationalist theory of scientific revolutions? Perhaps his statement in [6] gives us a clue: "Mostly in the adoption process. Kuhn helped me predict how the market would react to XP. . . ". Since XP will require significant change and since most people resist change, the adoption of XP will not be largely due to rationality and good arguments, but will instead require an emotional conversion or leap of faith. 15 It would seem that Beck gained this insight about the irrationality of paradigm shifts from Kuhn despite the fact that Kuhn never mentioned markets. Nonetheless, as Fuller writes, "Kuhn saw science as a knowledge enterprise". This may be the solution: although XP's values, principles and practices are highly rational according to Popper's critical rationalism, the adoption of XP as a whole will be a matter of emotion rather than logic, as full of hype and persuasive techniques as the selling of a new product on the market. This is, however, a significant departure from the strict use of Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions.
REFLECTION, AND OUTLOOK TO FU-TURE WORK
We conclude this paper with the following reflection. In this paper, we have exercised applied philosophy: applied in the sense that, in contrast to pure philosophy, we did not discuss, as such, a general problem (e.g. the problem of knowledge or the problem of science). Instead, our discussion was motivated occasionally by the specific problem related to SE as outlined in the introduction. Our paper would be incomplete without a (however brief) reflection on the possible limitations of such an approach. Especially in our context, two questions deserve to be asked: (a) Is Kuhn's view of the (history of the) scientific world largely correct, or is his opinion itself merely a paradigma temporary fashion which is likely soon to be superseded by another, with its own set of believers and dedicated followers? (b) Regardless of whether or not Kuhn's model is intrinsically plausible, did we apply it consistently and appropriately to our specific problem in the context of SE? In this paper, instead of attempting to answer question (a) ourselves, we refer to the ongoing philosophical discourse with inputs from a great diversity of sources such as critical theory (School of Frankfurt), critical rationalism (Popper, Albert, et al.), pragmatism or pragmaticism in their various forms (Peirce, James, et al.), various versions of metascientific relativism (Nietzsche, Feyerabend, et al.) and many others. Future work might delve somewhat deeper into the details of these issues. As far as (b) is concerned, it is conceded that it is methodologically daring to apply something like Kuhn's model, which was conceived as a historic meta-theory about scientific theories, to the field of SE which is, more than anything else, a technical practice and not a mathematically formulated, predictive scientific "theory" in the classical sense of the term. However, underlying the practice of each SE methodology, its advocates would undoubtedly appeal to a "theory", albeit a social theory, asserting that "if you produce software using this particular methodology, then the outcome is likely to be effective and efficient in producing software of the appropriate quality." This renders the practice of SE akin to other practice-oriented disciplines such as medicine or the social sciences, which have to rely for predictive purposes on heuristics, rather on than the precision of mathematics. It would seem, therefore, that it is the more or less implicit adherence of various individuals to various versions of such a background theory, which makes the discipline of SE prone to the formation of opinion-based "schools" which Kuhn (as well as Feyerabend and others) have mentioned in their writings.
On the other hand, however, from a small-scale perspective of SE, there is no room for "opinion" and hence, no room for a Kuhnian critique. Thus, a Kuhnian perspective has nothing to say about a computer program that would, for example, report the square of 2 to be 5. From this smallscale perspective of SE, Kuhnian thought seems much less applicable. Instead, at this level, the simple Popperian (respectively Peircean) ideas of conjecture and falsification are, indeed, more applicable.
